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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation
mechanism in the market for information intermediaries, such as rating
agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation so as
to enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. In the
model, behavior is determined by weighing the current rating fee against
the future value the rating agency derives from having a higher reputation.
I show that competition worsens the quality of ratings by reducing the
value of high reputation but not the short-term gain of cheating.
1 Motivation
Information intermediaries can potentially alleviate the problem of asymmetric
information between buyers and sellers of a product. Credit rating agencies
convey information about credit-worthiness of an issuer of nancial product;
certifcation bodies such as standard-setting organizations, organic certiers and
accreditation agencies convey information about whether the product or pro-
duction process satisfy certain properties. The value of these agencies rely on
their ability to credibly convey information about the product they rate.
When the information intermediary is paid for by the sellers whose product
they evaluate, there are potential conicts of interests that can compromise
the value of information delivered. A seller may threaten not to give the
intermediary its current business unless a good rating is given. Alternatively, it
may threaten not to give the intermediary its future business, or other types of
business. The conicts of interests are mitigated by reputation concern. If the
intermediary delivers poor information, in the future their rating will not receive
high value from the market participants and thus they can not charge a high
fee for their service. Because the value of information delivered is determined
by reputation mechanism, policy e¤ect on this mechanism should be carefully
examined.
There seems to be widely-held belief that competition enhances reputation
mechanism. One goal of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was to
increase competition in the credit rating industry by making more explicity the
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requirements to become a Nationally Recognised Statistical Ratings Organisa-
tions. Richard A. Posner proposes eliminating the status of NRSRO in order to
increase competition because market disciplines will mitigate potential conicts
of interests.1 On the other hand, some empirical studies such as Becker et al.
(2008) suggest that increasing competition in the rating industry causes more
issuer-friendly ratings and worsens the value of information.
This project provides theoretical investigation on whether competition strength-
ens or weakens reputation mechanism when conicts of interests arise from fore-
going current rating business. Concern of reputation comes from the di¤erence
between the future value of a rating agency with a good track record and that
of one with a bad track record. I will use a dynamic model of reputation to
endogenize the value of reputation and compare equilibria under monopoly and
duopoly.
Perfect monitoring implies that the agency loses its reputation once it lies.
When an information intermediary cannot prot by adding no information to
the market, Markov equilibrium structure implies that once an agency loses
its reputation, its value drops to 0. Thus, the cost of cheating is simply the
discounted value of future reputation from a good track record. Because a
monopolist rating agency can extract all surplus from a seller, competition can
only reduce the surplus left to a rating agency and hence the future value of
good reputation. However, competition may also drive down the fee a rating
agency can charge for its current business. I will show that competition increases
the surplus left to a seller with a good product, and thus decreases value of
reputation to a rating agency. However, competition does not increase surplus
left to a seller with a bad product unless both agencies lie with probability 1.
This is because the expected surplus a bad seller gets from a rating agency is
not monotonic in the rating fee it charges. If rating fee is low, the agency will
not lie for the bad seller. On the other hand, if rating fee is above the agencys
discounted future value of reputation, the agency will give a good rating to the
bad seller for sure. When a rating agency randomizes between lying and not
lying for a seller with a bad product, it must charge a fee equal to its discounted
future value of reputation. If it leaves positive surplus to a bad seller, then it
can increase the expected surplus it gives to a bad seller by charging a slightly
higher fee. Therefore, by charging a slightly higher fee, it will not lose its
market share and thus will get a higher payo¤. Thus in equilibrium, an agency
must leave zero surplus to a bad seller if it randomizes. Because in equilibrium
an agency charges a bad seller up to its willingness to pay for a good rating
under both monopoly and duopoly, while the future value of reputation is lower
under monopoly due to rent left to a good seller under competition, an agency
lies with higher probability under duopoly and the value of a good rating is
lower under duopoly.
Many papers in the literature on information intermediaries assume that
intermediaries are able to commit to a disclosure policy and focus on the preci-
1See < http://www.nreg21.com/lombard-street/the-presidents-blueprint-reforming-
nancial-regulation-a-critique-part-ii>
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sion of information they provide. They aim to explain the crude grading scheme
employed by intermediaries in reality. For example, Lizzeri (1999) shows that
the optimal disclosure policy of an intermediary with perfect information facing
risk-neutral buyers is a pass-fail system that only discloses whether the product
gives non-negative value to the consumer. They show that with competition a
full-disclosure equilibrium exists. Doherty et al. (2009) show that when buyers
are risk-averse, competing rating agencies will each use a di¤erent rating scale.
In contrast this project studies the information provision problem when in-
termediaries cannot commit and rely on reputation mechanism to provide in-
centives to follow a rating rule. Strausz (2005) studies conditions under which
intermediaries will not collude with the seller whom they rate via an enforceable
side-contract with transfers. This project builds on Mathis et al (2009) who use
a dynamic model of reputation and show conditions under which reputation
concern is insu¢ cient to prevent rating ination. Bolten et al. (2008) use a
static model with exogenous value of reputation and reach a similar conclusion
that reputation costs may be insu¢ cient to prevent rating ination.
Several papers discuss the e¤ect of competition on reputation mechanisms.
Most address the moral hazard problem for the producer to provide quality.
Horner (2002) shows that in such markets, competition enhances reputation
concern and improves quality because it increases the future value of having
a higher reputation by improving consumers outside options and drastically
lowering a rms value of low reputation. In Horner (2002), current gain is
equal to saving of the costly e¤orts and is indepdent of market structure, while
in this project, current gain from lying is equal to current rating fee and may
depend on market structure. For markets of information intermediaries, Strausz
(2005) shows that the threat of collusion makes the market for rating agencies
a natural monopoly. They nd equilibria under competition where one agency
gets all the business and remains honest. Bolten et al. (2008) is closest in spirit
to this project. However, they dont provide conclusive answer to the e¤ect of
competition because of exogenous value of reputation.
2 Model Setup
In every period t = 0; 1; 2; :::, a seller arrives with a new product, which is either
good or bad. The buyers do not know the quality of the product, but believe
that a new product is good with probability . Let w (p) denote the gains to
the seller if the buyers share a common belief that the product is good with
probability p.
Assumption w (:) is increasing, w () = 0 and w (1) > w (p) for all p < 1.
Therefore, there is no value to revealing no information about a seller.
In the beginning of period 0, one or two (depending on the market structure)
rating agencies (CRA) are born. Denote by I the set of rating agencies. I = f1g
under monopoly and I = f1; 2g under duopoly. Rating agencies are long-lived
prot maximizers with discount factor  2 (0; 1). They perfectly observe the
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quality of the new product when it arrives and can communicate to the market
through issuing a rating. A rating agency may be honestor opportunistic.
An honest agency cannot lie, i.e. it can only issue a good rating to a good
product and bad rating to a bad product. An opportunistic agency will lie
if doing so increases its discounted sum of payo¤s. The buyers, sellers and
competitor rating agency all share a common prior that with probability q0i
rating agency i is honest and with probability 1  q0i that he is opportunistic.
Within a period, the game proceeds as follows.
1. A seller arrives with a new product of quality v 2 fg; bg. Both the seller
and the rating agencies observe v. The buyers share a common prior that
the new product is good with probability .
2. Bertrand competition in rating fee:
(a) Rating agencies post simultaneously their rating fee i.
(b) The seller decides whether to, and if so, with which rating agency to
initiate a rating deal.
3. Rating choice:
(a) If the seller chooses to initiate a deal with agency i, agency i then
chooses a rating m 2 fGi; Big.
(b) After observing the report, the seller decides whether to purchase it.
(c) If the seller decides to purchase the rating, the agency publishes it. If
the seller decides not to purchase it, the agency can choose whether
to and if so, which rating to publish. Publishing a rating has no cost.
4. Payo¤ realization and belief updates:
(a) The market observes the rating or the lack thereofm 2 [i2I fGi; Big[
f;g where ; denotes a null rating, i.e. no published rating. The buy-
ers then forms a posterior pm about the quality of the product.
(b) If w (pm) > 0, the buyers try out the new product and learn perfectly
its quality. If w (pm) = 0, the buyers do not try the new product and
do not learn its quality. After observing the market outcome o, the
buyers update their belief about the rating agency o
The solution concept we use is Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Therefore,
every players strategy within a period depends on the history only through
q = (qi)i2I , where qi denotes the commonly held probability with which agency
i is honest. Then the expected payo¤ from the beginning of a period onward,
denoted by V (:), depends only on the reputation q at the beginning of the
period. We look at equilibria where V (:) is strictly increasing in own reputation
and V (q) > 0 for all q 2 (0; 1)jIj.
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Strategy of an Agency Given the reputation q at the beginning of the
period, a Markov strategy for an opportunistic agency i species the rating
fee vi (q)  0 it o¤ers when the new product is of quality v, the probability
it issues a good rating to a good seller after charging fee i, yi (q; i), the
probability it issues a good rating to a bad seller after charging fee i, denoted
by xi (q; i), and the rating d
v (q) 2 fGi; Bi; ;g it publishes after the seller
initiates a deal with itself but then rejects its rating. 2Denote by xi (q) and
yi (q) the equilibrium probability an opportunistic agency i issues a good rating
to a bad seller and a good seller respectively.
A Markov strategy for an honest agency is similar except that it cannot
choose a bad rating when the product is good nor can it choose a good rating
when the product is bad. Its rating strategy is thus trivial.
Belief Revision Buyers update their belief about the seller to pm (q) after
observing the rating m, and update the belief about the agency to o (q).
Lemma 1 w
 
pBi (q)

= 0 if V (q) > 0.
Proof. Suppose w
 
pBi (q)

> 0.
Case 2 Good seller pays with probability 1 on the equilibrium path. Then we
need yi (q) < 1 for p
Bi (q) > 0. Then Gigi (qi; qj) > qi > 0 = 
Big
i (q). But
then agency i strictly prefers to issue a good rating because V

Gigi (qi; qj)


V (q) > 0 = V

Bigi (q)

.
Case 3 Good seller refuses to pay with positive probability on the equilibrium
path. If Vi
 
; (q)

> 0 = V
 
Big (q)

, then both types of agencies will issue
a null rating to a good seller if it refuses to pay. But then pBi (q) = 0 con-
tradiction. If Vi
 
; (q)

= 0, then ;i (q) < q because V (q) > 0. But then
Gigi (q) > qi because an honest agency either publishes a good rating or no rat-
ing for a good seller. So V
 
Gig (q)
  V (q) > 0. But then both types strictly
prefer to publish a good rating after a good seller refuses to pay. So pBi (q) = 0,
contradiction.
Lemma 4 w
 
p; (q)

= 0 in a weakly undominated equilibrium.
2dv does not depend on either the proposed fee i or the proposed rating mi because
(i;mi) does not a¤ect agency is expected payo¤ when the seller rejects its proposed rating.
This is because the buyers and future sellers do not observe agency is fee o¤er i and proposed
rating mi, and thus (i;mi) do not a¤ect their belief about agency i and thus does not a¤ect
agency is future payo¤. In addition, once the seller rejects is rating, it will not pay and thus
(i;mi) does not a¤ect is current payo¤ either. Therefore, in a Markov equilibrium, the
outside option for a seller after she initiates a deal does not depend on the rating the agency
proposes.
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Proof. W.l.o.g. assume that w
 
pG1 (q)
  w  pG2 (q). Assume to the con-
trary that w
 
p; (q)

> 0. Then either a good seller does not initiate with
probability 1 after equilibrium fee o¤er, or a good seller refuses to pay with
positive probability.
1. If w
 
p; (q)

> w
 
pG1 (q)

, then no seller will initiate a deal with any
agency. So p; (q) =  but then w
 
p; (q)

= 0, contradiction.
2. If w
 
p; (q)

= w
 
pG1 (q)

> w
 
pB1 (q)

, then a bad seller will not initiate
a deal with agency 1. But then w
 
pG1 (q)

= w (1) > 0, contradiction.
3. If w
 
p;

< w
 
pG1 (q)

and w
 
pG1 (q)
   w  p; (q) > V  Bi (q)  
V
 
Gig (q)

, then after receiving 1 = w
 
pG1 (q)
   w  p;   ", a good
seller strictly prefers to initiate with agency 1 and strictly prefers to pay
once a good rating is issued. But then agency 1 can strictly increase the
probability that a good seller pays to 1 if it decreases its fee by any " > 0,
a protable deviation. A contradiction.
4. If w
 
p;

< w
 
pG1 (q)

and w
 
pG1 (q)
   w  p; (q)  V  Bi (q)  
V
 
Gig (q)

. If g1 (q) > w
 
pG1 (q)
 w  p; (q), or g1 (q) = w  pG1 (q) 
w
 
p; (q)

and y1 (q) < 1, then a good seller does not initiate with agency 1
because w
 
pB1 (q)

= 0. But then pG1 (q) = 0, contradiction. So g1 (q) <
w
 
pG1 (q)
 w  p; (q) and yi (q) = 0 or g1 (q) = w  pG1 (q) w  p; (q)
and yi (q) = 1. If y

i (q) = 0, then 
Gig
i (q) = 1, so w
 
pG1 (q)
  
w
 
p; (q)
  V  Bi (q)   V  Gig (q)  0 because V is increasing in
own reputation. Contradiction to w
 
pG1 (q)

> w
 
p; (q)

. If yi (q) = 1
and q1 (q) = w
 
pG1 (q)
   w  p; (q), a good seller is indi¤erent between
initiating and not initiating with 1, but initiating with 1 is weakly domi-
nated.
It is useful to focus on symmetric equilibria in which both types of rating
agencies o¤er the same rating fee, and the sellers belief about an agency does
not change with the fee o¤erings. That is, signaling happens only to the extent
of the rating chosen, not the rating fee. This further implies that the buyers
belief about an agency does not depend on the identity of the rater or the lack
thereof. Therefore, buyersbelief about agency j does not change if j does not
publish a rating. There are two reasons to focus on equilibria in which only the
rating itself has signaling value. First, identity of rater has signaling value only
under duopoly. Thus to better facilitate comparison of equilibria, we choose
equilibria that have the same properties as those under monopoly. Second,
this simplies the analysis and we think delivers the intuition. In addition,
Ill look at only equilbria in which a rating is published with probability 1 in
equilibrium. Therefore, the probability that a seller rated is good is equal to
the prior . Because a null rating ; is o¤-equilibrium-path, I will specify belief
; (q) such that if a bad seller refuses to pay, an agency will publish a bad rating;
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if a good seller refuses to pay, an honest agency will publish no rating and an
opportunistic agency will publish a bad rating. I will discuss the uniqueness of
such equilibria later.
Strategy of a seller Because an agency does not publish a good rating when
the seller refuses to pay, and the value of a bad rating or null rating is 0, it is
a best response for a seller to pay for a good rating issued by agency i if and
only if the fee agency i charges (i) is no larger than the value of its good rating
w
 
pGi (q)

; a seller will not pay for a bad rating. A seller initiates a deal with
an agency who o¤ers the highest non-negative expected payo¤.
The core of the analysis is to establish the equilibrium value of a good rating
from agency i, w
 
pGi (q)

, and reputation updates after agency i issues a good
rating Gig (q) for a good seller and after i issues a bad rating Bi (q), for every
agency i 2 I.
Agencys rating choice In equilibrium, a seller does not pay for a bad rating,
and pays for a good rating if and only if i  w
 
pGi (q)

, after charging i 
w
 
pGi (q)

, the current gain from issuing a good rating instead of a bad one
is simply i and while the future cost of issuing a good rating is c
v
i (q) :=
V
 
Bi (q)
  V  Giv (q) if the seller is of type v.
If i > w
 
pGi (q)

, then it is weakly dominated for a seller to initiate a
deal with agency i. Therefore, in the following discussion, i  w
 
pGi (q)

.
Because w
 
pBi (q)

= 0, if i publishes a bad rating, the buyers will not try
the product and its reputation will be updated to Bi (q) even if the product
is actually good. If Vi (q) > 0, then w
 
pGi (q)

> w
 
p; (q)

= 0. Thus after
i publishes a good rating the buyers will try the product, nd out about the
quality v and update is reputation to Giv (q). If i issues a bad rating, the
seller will not pay because w
 
pBi (q)

= 0. Agency i will then publish a bad
rating because Bi (q)  Giv (q) for both v 2 fg; bg in equilibrium. Therefore,
the cost of issuing a good rating is the discounted di¤erence in the value of its
future reputation, denoted by cvi (q) = V
 
Bi (q)
   V  Giv (q), and the
gain of issuing a good rating is the current rating fee i because a seller pays
for a good rating but not for a bad rating. It follows that
x (q; i) =
8<: 1 if i > c
b
i (q)
2 [0; 1] if i = cb (q)
0 if i < c
b (q)
and
y (q; i) =
8<: 1 if i > c
g (q)
2 [0; 1] if i = cg (q)
0 if i < c
g (q)
.
Denote by xi (q) and y

i (q) the probability on the equilibrium path.
Lemma 5 Gigi (q)  qi.
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Proof. Conditional on a good seller, a good rating is published if the seller
initiates, the agency issues a good rating, and the seller agrees to pay. This
is immediate because an honest agency always issues a good rating to a good
seller.
Lemma 6 If w () = 0, then V (0; q i) = 0.
Proof. If qi = 0, then agency is reputation will not change regardless of
outcome. Therefore, an opportunistic agency i will issue the rating for which
a seller has highest reservation price regardless of the quality of the product.
Therefore, no information is revealed by agency is rating and in equilibrium,
pGi = i. If i = , then w
 
pGi

= 0 and agency i can never charge a positive
fee for its rating and thus the discounted sum of payo¤ for agency i is 0. If
i >  and w (i) > 0, then a seller initiates a deal with i with probability 1.
Otherwise, a seller must get zero expected payo¤ from initiating with agency i.
Then i has a protable deviation because i lowers its fee to w (i) ", a seller will
initiate with i with probability 1, and i gets w (i)   " > 0 from the increased
market share for any arbitrarily small price decrease ". A contradiction. But
then i =  because seller of both types initate with i.
It follows that as long as V (q) > 0, V
 
Gig (q)
  V (q) > V  Gib (q) and
the reputation costs from issuing a good rating is higher when the seller is bad.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Monopoly
The optimality of rating fee implies that a monopolist leaves no surplus to a
seller regardless of the quality of his product and charges him his reservation
price for a good rating. That is, g1 (q) = 
b
1 (q) = w (q). Thus, even though in
Mathis et al (2009) it is implicitly assumed that the rating fee is equal to the
value of a good rating to the seller, the equilibrium in their game is a regular
equilibrium in the aforementioned model.
Lemma 7 y (q) = 1.
Proof. Because g1 (q) = 
b
1 (q) = w (q), the gain from issuing a good rating
does not depend on sellers type, but the costs are higher for a bad seller. It
follows that either y (q) = 1 or x (q) = 0. Suppose x (q) = 0, then pG (q) = 1
and Gg (q)  B (q). But then giving a bad rating to a good seller implies
forgoing current rating fee equal to w
 
pG (q)

= w (1) > 0, without gaining
higher reputation and higher future value. Therefore, the monopolist must
strictly prefers to give a good rating to a good seller, a contradiction.
A seller initiates a deal for sure, and a rating is published for sure. Therefore,
when there is only one rating agency, a seller rated by the monopolist is good
with probability . Given the current reputation q and the buyersbelief that
an opportunistic CRA lies with probability x, the buyers believe that a product
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receiving a good rating is good with probability ~p (q; x) = +(1 )(1 q)x ; the
rating agencys reputation rises to B (q; x) = qq+(1 q)x after issuing a bad
rating. Because the buyers observe quality perfectly after trying out the good,
the rating agencys reputation remains q if it issues a good rating to a good
seller, and drops to 0 if it issues a good rating to a bad seller.
Because a seller does not purchase a bad rating, when faced with a bad
product, issuing a bad rating means losing the current rating fee b = w (~p (q; x))
but enjoying a reputation of B (q; x) as opposed to 0. They show that when
1+ < 1 , the monopolist rating agency lies with probability 1 when reputation
is high. This is because when q is high, current gain of rating fee w (~p (q; x)) at
any level of x is higher than the value of a perfect reputation. It follows that
the value of such high level of reputation V (q) is equal to w(~p(q;1))1  because on
the equilibrium path, the agency gets his rating fee equal to w (~p (q; 1)) and his
reputation either remains the same or drops to 0. For lower reputation q, the
equilibrium probability x (q) is pinned down by the indi¤erence condition
w (~p (q; x)) = V
 
B (q; x)

,
that is
w


+ (1  ) (1  q)x

= V

q
q + (1  q) (1  x)

. (1)
This equation has a unique solution as long because the value function V is
increasing in reputation.
3.2 Duopoly
3.2.1 Equilibrium Probability of Lying
Now we consider competition between two long-lived rating agencies with iden-
tical discount factor  2 (0; 1).
Choice of Rating Fee Because a seller obtains positive payo¤ only if a good
rating is published and an honest agency i always issues a good rating to a good
seller, the expected payo¤ a good seller gets from initiating with agency i when
i charges i is
Ugi (q; i) := (qi + (1  qi) y (q; i))
 
w
 
pGi
  i .
Because an honest agency i does not issue a good rating to a bad seller, the
expected payo¤ a bad seller gets from initiating with agency i when i charges
i is
U bi (q; i) := (1  qi)x (q; i)
 
w
 
pGi
  i .
By o¤ering di¤erent fee i, agency i changes the amount of surplus it leaves
the seller if seller initiates a deal with i. Bertrand competition forces agencies
to compete in leaving more surplus to a seller in order to get his business until
9
one agency gets zero surplus. Denote by U
v
i (q) the maximal possible surplus
agency i can leave to a seller of type v. Then seller type v initiates with i with
probability 1 if U
v
i (q) > U
v
 i (q). Generally the lower the fee is, the higher
the surplus Uvi (q; i) for the seller. However, the function is discontinuous at
i = c
v
i (q), the reputation costs to issue a good rating.
If on the equilibrium path at some state (qi; qj), CRAi randomizes between
giving a good and a bad rating, CRAi must be indi¤erent between the cur-
rent gain of rating fee and the discounted future value of reputation di¤erence.
Therefore, if CRAi increases his rating fee, subsequently he will have a strict
incentive to give a good rating. Therefore, if seller type v obtains a positive
expected surplus from CRAi on the equilibrium path, the seller must obtain a
greater expected surplus if CRAi increases its rating fee by a small amount. Be-
cause the rating agencies engage in price competition, if CRAi leaves a positive
surplus in equilibrium, both agencies must leave the same surplus. Therefore,
by increasing its rating fee by " > 0, CRAi can increase its payo¤, a contradic-
tion. Thus in equilibrium either CRAi leaves zero surplus to a seller or CRAi
gives a good rating for sure. Lemma 8 summarizes this.
Lemma 8 If Uvi (qi; qj ; 
v (qi; qj)) > 0, then y (qi; qj ; 
g (qi; qj)) = 1 if v = g,
and x

qi; qj ; 
b (qi; qj)

= 1 if v = b.
Proof. Otherwise, conditional on the arrival of a type-v seller, CRAi can earn "
more by charging v (qi; qj)+" if CRAi weakly prefers rating a type-v seller. If
CRAi strictly prefers letting the opponent rate type-v seller, charging 
v (qi; qj)
and leaving a positive surplus to type-v seller is weakly dominated by raising
the rating fee and leaving a negative surplus to type-v seller.
If CRAi does not give a good rating for sure to a good seller, then it must be
giving zero expected surplus to a good seller and thus the value of CRAis good
rating is no greater than the discounted value of future reputation di¤erence.
Since giving a good rating to a bad seller has worse consequence than giving a
good rating to a good seller, CRAi must give a bad rating to a bad seller for
sure. But then giving a good rating is more indicative of a rating agency being
the honest type. Thus CRAi must prefer to give a good rating to a good seller.
Let V (qi; qj) denote the discounted sum of payo¤s for rating agency i when own
reputation is qi and the opponents reputation is qj .
Because yi (q) > 0, lemma 8 says that either yi (q) = 1 or agency i leaves zero
surplus to a good seller. The following lemma says that in a regular equilibrium
under duopoly, an opportunistic agency i issues a good rating to a good seller
with probability 1, just like under monopoly.
Lemma 9 yi (q) = 1 if w
 
pGi

> 0
Proof. First we show that yi > 0. If not, then Gig (qi; qj) = (1; qj) and
Bi (qi) < 1. It follows that V
 
Gig (qi; qj)
  V  Bi (qi; qj). If strict
inequality holds, then it is optimal for i to give a good rating to a good seller
for any   0. A contradiction. If equality holds, then yi = 0 is optimal
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only if gi = 0. Suppose in equilibrium, i rates a good seller with positive
probability, then by raising rating fee to " > 0, i will issue a good rating to a
good seller for sure, thus increasing the surplus left to a good seller and current
payo¤ to himself. Therefore, i will not lose any good seller and will increase
its own payo¤, a contradiction. Therefore, i must rate a good seller with zero
probability, but then i = 0 and w
 
pGi

= 0, contradiction.
Suppose yi 2 (0; 1). If Ugi > 0, then yi = 1 by lemma 8. If Ugi = 0, then
w (pi) = i (qi; qj) = V
 
Bi (qi; qj)
  V  Gig (qi; qj) .
Because Gigi (q) > qi, V
 
Gig (qi; qj)
  V (q) > 0. Therefore w (pi) <
V
 
Bi (qi; qj)

and thus xi (qi; qj) = 0, in which case Bi (qi) < qi (because
xi = 0 and yi < 1) and V
 
Bi (qi; qj)

< V
 
Gig (qi; qj)

because Gig (qi)  qi
and V increasing in own reputation. It follows that w (pi) < 0, a contradiction.
Because y (q) = 1, pGi (q) = ii+(1 i)(1 qi)xi where i is the probability
that a seller rated by agency i is good.
Lemma 8 and the nature of Bertrand competition between agencies imply
that a bad seller is left with zero surplus unless both agencies give a bad seller
a good rating for sure. Thus when CRAi lies with probability between (0; 1),
the probability of lying xi is determined by
w

i
i + (1  i) (1  qi)xi

= V

qi
qi + (1  qi) (1  xi) ; qj

.
We will now show that whenever two rating agencies have di¤erent initial
reputations, the leading rating agency is the only active one if the value of being
a leading rating agency is greater than that of being a trailing rating agency.
Therefore, if i is active, then i = .
We rst establish this statement for boundaries on the top.
Lemma 10 In equilibrium, a seller initiates a deal with agency 1 with proba-
bility 1 if q1 = 1 > q2.
Proof.
Ug1 (1; q2) : = w (1) 
 
V
 
Bi (q)
  V (q)
= w (1)
 w  pG2 (q)   V  B2 (q)  V (q)
and strictly inequality holds unless x2 (q) = 0. If strictly inequality holds,
then in equilibrium under Bertrand competition for good sellers, agency 1 will
charge a fee so that a good seller initiates with agency 1 with probability 1.
If x2 (q) = 0 and U
g
1 (1; q2) = U
g
2 (1; q2), Bertrand competition implies that
g1 = 
g
2 = 0. But then agency 1 does not get positive fee payment from a seller
of any type, and its reputation never changes and thus V (q2; 1) = 0+ V (q2; 1)
and V (1; q2) = 0 for all q2 < 1. But then V (q1; q2) = 0 for all q 2 [0; 1] [0; 1].
Contradiction to our assumption that V (q) 6= 0.
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Lemma 11 V (1; 1) =
1
2 (1 )w(1)
1  .
Proof. Agency i charges a bad seller w (1) because a bad seller expects zero
surplus no matter what the rating fee is from being given a bad rating by the
honest agency i. Bertrand competition implies gi = 0.
It is easy to see that V (r; 1) = 0 for all r < 1 because the trailing agency
believes that the opponent is honest and thus will never lose its reputation.
Hence, the trailing agency will never get any payment from a seller and thus
obtains zero value. The following lemma shows that the trailing agency gives
zero surplus to both a bad seller and a good seller.
Lemma 12  (r; 1) = 0 and pG2 = 0.
Proof. Because leading agency has perfect reputation, it is going to give a bad
seller a good rating with zero probability. Therefore, it leaves zero surplus to
a bad seller. Therefore, Bertrand competition implies that in equilibrium, the
trailing agency leaves zero surplus to a bad seller too. But because V (r; 1) = 0
for r < 1, the surplus a trailing agency leaves a good seller is V (r; 1) = 0.
Therefore, either  (r; 1) = 0 and pG2 = 0 or
w

 (q2; 1)
 (q2; 1) + (1   (q2; 1)) (1  q2)

= V (1; 1) .
But if
w

 (q2; 1)
 (q2; 1) + (1   (q2; 1)) (1  q2)

= V (1; 1) > 0,
If g2  V (1; 1), then in equilibrium a good seller gets zero surplus from CRA1.
CRA2 can lower its price to below V (1; 1) and gets a good seller and thus a
strictly positive value. Therefore, g2 < V (1; 1) and y2 = 0, a contradiction.
Because  (r; 1) = 0 for all r < 1, we have v (1; r) = w (1) and v (r; 1) = 0
for v 2 fg; bg. It follows that V (1; r) = w(1)1  = V (1).
We now establish that an agency weakly prefers to rate a seller to letting
the opponent rate it. Therefore, the costs of publishing a good rating are the
di¤erence between giving a bad rating and a good rating. Consider a good
seller. Because y (q) = 1 in equilibrium, Gig (q) = q. Payo¤ if the opponent
rates it is V
 
Gjg (q)

= V (q). Payo¤ if i rates it is gi (q)+ V
 
Gig (q)
 
V (q). So i weakly prefers to rate a good seller. Consider a bad seller. If
V
 
Bi (q)

< xj (q) (1  qj)V (qi; 0) +
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  xj (q)

V
 
Bj (q)

,
then if i does rate a bad seller, the fee i charges must be greater than or equal
to xj (q) (1  qj)V (qi; 0)+
 
qj + (1  qj)
 
1  xj (q)

V
 
Bj (q)

, thus greater
than V
 
Bi (q)

. So xi (q) = 1 and thus 
Bi (q) = (1; qj). Because V (1; qj) =
V (1) > V (q) for all qi < 1 and qj < 1. Then we get a contradiction.
Now we will show that the leading agency gets all the rating business.
Lemma 13 Let V be the value function of a regular equilibrium. If V (q1; q2) >
V (q2; q1) where q1 > q2, then a seller initiates with the leading agency, agency
1, with probability 1 at q.
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Proof. y (q) = 1. So gi (q)  V
 
Bi (q)
  V  Gig (q). Maximal surplus
agency i can leave to a good seller is
Ugi (q) := w
 
pGi (q)
   V  Bi (q)  V (q) .
If xi (q) 2 (0; 1) for i 2 (1; 2), then U bi (q) = 0 and w
 
pGi (q)

= V
 
Bi (q)

,
and Ugi (q) = V (q).
If x (q1; q2) = 1, then
Ug1 (q) = w

1
1 + (1  1) (1  q1)

  V (1; q2) + V (q1; q2)
=
U b1 (q)
1  q1 + V (q1; q2) .
If Ug1 (q)  Ug1 (q), then 1 < 2, x2 (q) = 1 and U
b
1 (q)
1 q1 <
Ub2 (q)
1 q2 . But then price
competition in the bad seller market implies that a bad seller initiates with 2
with probability 1. Either 1 = 1 > 2 or 2 =  and a seller initiates with 1
with probability 0. But in the latter case V (q1; q2) < V (q2; q1), contradiction.
Therefore, when CRAi is active, i = . So the current gain from lying
is the same function of x as that under monopoly, while the future discounted
value of reputation as a function of x is weakly lower than that under monopoly.
As a result, the equilibrium probability of lying in monopoly is lower. Because
whenever x < 1, future reputation is not perfect. We will show that value
of reputation is strictly lower under monopoly as long as the reputation is not
perfect. Thus equilibrium probability of lying is strictly higher under duopoly.
3.2.2 Construction of equilibrium
I will construct an equilibrium in which when reputations di¤er, a seller initiates
a deal with the leading agency for sure, and randomizes with equal probability
between the two when they have the same reputations. By symmetry, it is
w.l.o.g. to assume that CRA1 is the leading agency. For clarity, denote the
reputation of the leading CRA by q and that of the trailing CRA by r. I will
rst establish equilibrium pricing behavior, choice of ratings and value for q = 1.
I will then work backwards for q 2 qD1 ; 1. Having done so for all q 2 qDk ; 1,
I will construct behavior and value for q 2 qDk+1; qD1  for some qDk+1 < qD.
We have shown that V (r; 1) = 0 and V (1; r) = w(1)1  = V (1) for all r < 1.
It follows that if 1  < 1, x (1; r) = 1 and x (1; r) = 0 if

1  > 1.
It follows immediately that when 1  > 1, it is an equilibrium in which
the leading CRA never lies. As a result, the value for a trailing CRA is 0.
Therefore, when lying does not happen in equilibrium under monopoly, industry
structure has no e¤ect on the value of ratings. For the rest of the discussion,
we will assume that 1  < 1.
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When 1  < 1, w (1) > V (1; r) and x (1; r) = 1. Let q
D
1 (r) be the
solution to
w
 

+ (1  )  1  qD1 (r)
!
= V (1; r) .
Because V (1; r) = V (1), this equation is exactly the same as the one that
determines qM1 . Thus q
D
1 (r) = q
M
1 for all r < 1. For q  qD1 , x (q; r) = 1 for
all r < q. Thus when the leading CRAs reputation is su¢ ciently high, the
value of a good rating does not depend on market structure. However, the
value to a CRA does. For q 2  qD1 ; 1, if a good seller arrives, reputations will
not change. When a bad seller arrives, the opportunistic leading CRA will lie
for sure and its reputation will drop to 0. If the leading CRA does not lie,
its reputation will rise to B1 (q; r) = 1 and CRA2s value conditional on that
event is V (r; 1) = 0. It follows that
V (r; q) = V (r; q) + (1  )  ((1  q)V (r; 0) + qV (r; 1)) .
Because V (r; 0) = V (r) and V (r; 1) = 0, rearranging the expression we get
V (r; q) =
(1  ) 
1   (1  q)V (r) .
This is strictly positive for any 0 < r < q < 1. In addition, it is strictly
increasing in r and decreasing in q. By lemma 8, either CRA2 leaves zero
surplus to a bad seller, or it lies with probability 1 conditional on getting a
deal from a bad seller, in which case the expected surplus a bad seller gets from
CRA2 is
(1  r)

w

2
2 + (1  2) (1  r)

  V (1; q)

. (2)
The largest expected surplus CRA1 can leave a bad seller in equilibrium is
(1  q)

w


+ (1  ) (1  q)

  V (1; r)

(3)
because in equilibrium x (q; r) = 1 and thus b (q; r)  V (1; r). Because
V (1; q) = V (1; r) and q > r, for CRA1 to win the Bertrand competition over a
bad seller, 2 < . Thus, expression 2 is positive only if r > qM1 . Given 2 such
that expression 2 is non-negative and no greater than expression 3, b (r; q) =
V (1; q) = V (1) and b (q; r) = w


+(1 )(1 q)

  1 r1 q

w

2
2+(1 2)(1 r)

  V (1; q)

.
The surplus CRA2 can give a good seller can then be no greater than
w

2
2 + (1  2) (1  r)

  V (1; q) + V (r; q) .
Thus in equilibrium g (r; q) = V (1; q) V (r; q) and g (q; r) = w


+(1 )(1 q)

 
w

2
2+(1 2)(1 r)

  V (1; q) + V (r; q)

. It follows that the value to the
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leading CRA is
1
1  w


+ (1  ) (1  q)

  
1   V (r; q)
  1
1  

+ (1  ) 1  r
1  q

w

2
2 + (1  2) (1  r)

  V (1; q)

<
1
1  
 
w


+(1 )(1 q)

  w

2
2+(1 2)(1 r)

+(V (1; q)  V (r; q))
!
.
Given 2 such that expression 2 is negative, x (r; q) < 1 and by lemma 8, the
expected surplus a bad seller obtains from CRA2 is zero. Thus CRA1 leaves zero
surplus to a bad seller in equilibrium as well and b (q; r) = w


+(1 )(1 q)

.
The largest surplus CRA2 can give a good seller is then V (r; q). Thus in
equilibrium CRA1 also leaves V (r; q) to a good seller. It follows that the
value to the leading CRA is
V (q; r) =
g (q; r) + (1  )b (q; r)
1   (4)
=
1
1  w


+ (1  ) (1  q)

  
1   V (r; q) :
Because V (q) = 11 w


+(1 )(1 q)

, the value to the leading CRA under
duopoly is strictly less than that under monopoly.
Notice that when q 2  qD1 ; 1, the value to the trailing agency, V (r; q),
depends only on the reputations of the agencies but not on the o¤ equilibrium
belief 2. The value to the leading agency, on the other hand, may be di¤erent in
di¤erent equilibria. However, in any equilibrium, this value is always strictly less
than that under monopoly and the upper bound is attained when o¤ equilibrium
path belief that a seller rated by the trailing agency is good with su¢ ciently
small probability. In addition, V (q; r) is the same across all equilibria in which
x (r; q) < 1. Thus for the purpose of nding equilibrium values, we do not need
to worry about the value of x (r; q) if it is less than 1.
Given V (q; r) increasing in q, V (r; q) decreasing in q for all q  qDk (r), let
qDk+1 (r) the solution of q to
w
0@ 
+ (1  )

1  q
qDk (r)

1A = V  qDk (r) ; r .
A solution qDk+1 (r) < q
D
k (r) exists because when the left hand side is in-
creasing in q and is greater than the right hand side when q = qDk (r). For
q 2  qDk+1 (r) ; qDk (r), dene B1 (q; r) to be the solution of  to
w
0@ 
+ (1  )

1  q

1A = V (; r) . (5)
15
A solution  2  qDk ; qDk 1 exists because the left hand side is decreasing in 
while the right hand side is increasing in  by construction, and the left hand
side is greater than the right hand side when  = qDk and smaller than the
right hand side when  = qDk 1. 
B1 (q; r) is increasing in q and decreasing
in r. Dene x (q; r) to be such that 1   (1  q)x = q
B1 (q;r)
. In equilibrium,
CRA1 lies with probability x (q; r). Thus the value of its good rating is equal to
w
0@ 
+(1 )

1  q
B1 (q;r)

1A and its reputation will become B1 (q; r) after issuing
a bad rating while the opponents reputation remains r. Equation 5 implies
that CRA1 is indi¤erent between giving a good and a bad rating to a bad seller.
V (r; q) =
(1  )
1   

(1  q)x (q; r)V (r) + q
B1 (q; r)
V
 
r; B1 (q; r)

=
(1  )
1   

V (r)  q
B1 (q; r)
 
V (r)  V  r; B1 (q; r) .
Because B1 (q; r) > qDk , by construction, V
 
r; B1 (q; r)

is decreasing in the
second argument. Therefore, V (r; q) is decreasing in q because B1 (q; r) is in-
creasing in q and q
B1 (q;r)
is increasing in q. In equilibrium, both agencies leave
zero surplus to a bad seller. Therefore, b (q; r) = w


+(1 )(1 q)x(q;r)

and
g (q; r) = w


+(1 )(1 q)x(q;r)

 V (r; q). Thus V (q; r) = 11 w
0@ 
+(1 )

1  q
B1 (q;r)

1A 

1 V (r; q) =

1 V
 
B1 (q; r) ; r
   1 V (r; q). Because  (q; r) is in-
creasing in q and V (r; q) is decreasing in q, V (q; r) is increasing in q. We
have thus found V (q; r) increasing in q and V (r; q) decreasing in q for all
q 2  qDk+1 (r) ; qDk (r).
4 Discussion of assumptions
A seller can walk away from a bad rating It is believed that the issuer-
pay model creates pressure from sellers for the rating agency to give a good
rating.3 In the model the pressure comes from threats to forego current rating
fee. This assumption is made in both Bolten et al (2008) and Mathis et al (2009).
It seems consistent with industry practice where a seller invites some rating
agencies to look over its product and conduct preliminary work before deciding
which rating agencies to select to rate the product afterwards. Stephen W.
Joynt, the CEO of Fitch Ratings, also stated that Fitch is frequently requested
by issuers to informally comment on the ratings e¤ect of big corporate events
3Richard Posner argued that This puts the NRSROs under greater pressure
to give the sellers of securities a high rating, and thus weakens market disci-
pline. See < http://www.nreg21.com/lombard-street/the-presidents-blueprint-reforming-
nancial-regulation-a-critique-part-ii>
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or multiple di¤erent scenarios. In an article about a reform in the rating fee
structure, Reuters cites New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo saying that
under the old fee system, the agencies had a nancial incentive to assign high
ratings because they only received fees if a deal was completed.4 Both [12]
and [?, ?] also assume that sellers can walk away from a bad rating and thus
does not pay.
A seller obtains one or no rating According to Joynt, in structured -
nance, Fitch is frequently one of two rating agencies rating a security chosen
by the issuer from among the three agencies.The market behavior seems to
change dramatically only after Fitch became an important third player.5 The
signicant e¤ect of increasing the number of rating agencies from two to three
may be driven by regulational requirements for some products to have at least
two ratings. As a simplied model to address this phenomenon, I assume that
a seller obtains at most one rating and compare equilibria when the number of
agencies increases from one to two. This setup enables comparison of equilibria
when a seller has a degree of freedom in choosing rating agencies.
Agencies observe the quality of the product before deciding on its rat-
ing fee This assumption is equivalent to assuming that a rating agency can
obtain information about the product costlessly. It is a simplifying assumption
reecting the fact that an agency has all the public information about the prod-
uct. According to Joynt, an objective opinion about the creditworthiness of an
issuer can be formed based solely on public information in many jurisdictions.6
In addition, a rating agency often follows an important rm even if it is not se-
lected to rate its issuances. Therefore, a rating agency knows a good deal about
a product before it makes an o¤er. Moreover, Joynt admits that structured
nance analysts may be involved in fee discussions7 and the analyst may learn
even more about the product during negotiation. This assumption also seems
consistent with the case-by-case nature of rating fees.8
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